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Background:¿e Nature of Pragmatic Inference
•Pragmatics concerns context-dependent inferences (generally assumed to be linked to
rational use of language by situated agents)
•How is this done (beyond and independent of particular algorithms, e.g., Gricean conversa-
tional maxims, relevance theory or argumentation theory)?
Mind-Reading
(see, e.g., Sperber and Wilson, 2002)
– Figure out epistemic state of interlocutors
–Determine inferences based on inferred
epistemic state of addressee
Simulation¿eory
(see, e.g., Carruthers and Smith, 1996, p. 3)
–Assume that interlocutor has same epis-
temic state as yourself
– Simulate likely inferences
•Dierence might matter when agents’ epistemic contexts are not identical, that is, when
they do not know and believe the same things (in real life: always)
•Not clear to which degree Mind-Reading is assumed to be psychologically real
•Mind-Reading is slow and error-prone (especially when agents share little common ground)
Epistemically Heterogeneous Social Networks
•Humans are an unusually social and cooperative species (for primates). As a consequence,
all langage learning (and most of language use) takes place in social networks.
Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely
homogeneous speech-community [. . . ] (Chomsky 1965, p. 3)
•¿is position necessarily ignores everything related to variation
•Variation is a key ingredient in language change
•Two kinds of heterogeneity will be investigated:
– contact in social networks; and
– partly diering epistemic contexts.
Reinforcement Learning with Polya Urns
•Polya-Urns provide a mathematical model
of reinforcement learning.
•Randomly draw a ball from the urn.
• If the ball corresponds to the correct answer,
a further ball will be added to the urn.
URNt
white:1
red:1
URNt+1
white:2
red:1
¿e probability of drawing ‘‘white’’ rises from 0.5 to 0.6˙
Learning Internally Dierentiated Lexical Items
• I assume internally dierentiated lexical representations like Pustejovsky’s qualia-structure.
Lexical Usage Prole of an Agent
is represented as array of pondered submeanings with respect to these 2 words:
W1Q1 W1Q2 W1Q3 W1Q4 W2Q1 W2Q2 W2Q3 W2Q4
Ag 1 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Ag 2 2000 2000 2000 1 1 1 1 2000
• Scenario:
–Two words are absolute synonyms (see Skyrms, 2010): any draw = success
–Each submeaning is an independent Polya urn (balls correspond to Word1 &Word2)
– Speaker draws a word, and signals to hearer
– Speaker & Hearer update weights for the chosen word
Mutation
•At some point in simulation: change in the surrounding world → agents adapt lexical
representations
• In a submeaning, two types are distinguished (Type1 keeps weight; Type2 initialized at 1)
• Instead of four submeanings, agents discriminate ve dierent submeanings
•Epistemic state of mutants is superset of epistemic state of non-mutants
General Pattern: Absence of Mutation vs. Mutation (Regardless of Inference Method)
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Mutation of Island 2
Pragmatics in Production
Mind-Reading Inferences
Agents discard for production parts of their own epistemic state the interlocutor lacks
Simulation Inferences
Agents always take into account their full epistemic state for production
Signicant dierences (p-values from Kruskal-Wallis test for network of 3 × 10 agents):
DCA1 CCWNMC1 CCWMC1 PCC1 DCA2 PCC2
1.54385e-09 1.689598e-49 0.008774732 8.998603e-12 0 4.782354e-09
Mind-Reading Increases Lexical Distance
•With Mind-Reading inference, the lexical
distance between agents of dierent islands
is bigger than with Simulation inference
•Because Mind-Readers discard non-shared
epistemic states, they leave a smaller foot-
print of their epistemic dierences
•All things being equal, the less agents take
into account other’s epistemic states, the
more similar they become
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